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Summary 
 
The European Security Research Programme (ESRP) takes the Europeanization of 
security into the new area of internal security scientific and technical cooperation. This 
raises important issues in the respect of public procurement that have parallels in the area 
of EU initiatives in defence procurement cooperation. A policy network analysis 
investigates research sharing in this new area for police major event security issue 
networks. The variable net work structures are found to be a factor in determining their 
responses. This is especially so because police services, in general, have only recently 
needed to address policy issues related to new technologies and scientific advances. 
Consequently the expertise in police or internal security science and technology is more 
narrowly based in police services than in the military and rarely reflected, at present, in 
the main EU police cooperation networks. Three particular challenges need to be tackled, 
firstly, too many Commission initiatives and ESRP projects have networking aims and 
these need to be rationalized, secondly, the EU police and internal security public sector 
agencies need to be aware of and capable of managing the growing commercial pressures 
and, thirdly, the EU police services need to become, in UK Ministry of Defence terms, 
“smart” customers to achieve value for money for the citizens of the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Working Paper only conveys solely the view of its author. 
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1. Introduction 
     Referring to the Prüm Convention, an analysis of EU security information flows by 
CEPS (T. Balzacq, D. Bigo, S. Carrera & E. Guild, 2006, p.14) argues: “[...] the 
conventional wisdom in the security field [is] that ‘more is better’ and that an increase in 
the number of databases increases security. However, insecurity is not acute because law 
enforcement authorities do not share enough information, but rather because they share it 
badly and in a multiplicity of different fora.” This paper examines the “multiplicity of 
different fora” issue in the context of Peterson’s discussions of policy networks (2004, 
p.120) and his distinction between “[...] tightly integrated policy communities” and “[...] 
loosely affiliated issue networks [...]. The paper follows the general methodology, as 
outlined in Peterson’s observation (2004, p.118-119) that “[...] most analyses of the EU 
which employ the policy network as a metaphor seek to test the basic proposition that the 
way in which networks are structured in any EU policy sector will determine, and thus 
help to explain and predict, policy outcomes.”       
           The first  impetus for the paper comes from recent developments in the EU in the 
area of internal security research and technology where a combination of EU Council, 
Council of Ministers, Commission and industrial agenda priorities have led to the 
initiation of wide-ranging EU cooperation initiatives. In some respects, these initiatives 
are comparable to the longer established Commission pressures for defence equipment 
cooperation and show clearly the Commission’s “autonomous actor” capacity (Bache and 
George, 2006, p.266) through the use of the “actor” competences of three DGs: Research, 
Enterprise and Industry and Justice, Freedom and Security. These internal security 
initiatives are now known as the European Security Research Programme (ESRP).  The 
initial stage in the development of ESRP was the February 2004 Commission 
Communication on “Preparatory Action on the enhancement of the European industrial 
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potential in the field of Security research” (PASR). The second stage was the March 2004 
Report of the Commission initiated industry-dominated Group of Personalities (GoP) 
entitled “Research for a Secure Europe” which recommended the launching of an EU 
funded ESRP. The GoP also recommended the establishment of a European “Security 
Research Advisory Board”, (ESRAB). ESRAB produced a definitive report in September 
2006 entitled “Meeting the Challenge”.ESRP is now fully established as a funding stream 
in Framework Programme 7 and the Commission has just published (September 2006) a 
linked initiative in its “Green Paper on detection and associated technologies in the work 
of law enforcement, customs and other security authorities.” So far these important 
attempts at EU internal security cooperation have received little general attention apart 
from Hayes’s pioneering monograph (2006). 
            The second impetus for this paper has come from the author’s participation in a 
ten-country EU project, known as EU-SEC, on “Coordinating National Research 
Programmes on Security during Major Events in Europe”, running from 2004-2008, an 
ERA Framework Programme 6 Project (FP6-02-ERA-1-CA-SSA – No. 011823).3 This 
project led by Europol for the EU and UNICRI brought together country representatives 
from the Member States police forces and interior ministries. All of these participants 
were in someway connected to what, in Peterson’s terms, can be described as the issue 
networks linked to the EU major event security policy area, which dates from the Trevi 
era. The EU major event security policy spectrum covers sporting events, such as the 
World Cup and the Olympics, and political events such as EU Council Meetings, G8 
meetings and state visits.  
      The EU-SEC project was based upon the assumptions that, firstly, there are or might 
be national research programmes on security during major events in Europe and, 
                                                 
3 The author’s role in the EU-SEC Project was to research and draft the Report on the UK Team’s task, as 
set out in the Project specification, to carry out an “assessment of the obstacles that hinder the coordination 
of research programmes.” 
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secondly, that there would be a benefit from coordinating such research. The Project 
‘Abstract’ referred to such coordinating activity as having a risk reduction objective. This 
objective was to be achieved by “[…] carrying out a networking activity among national 
research programmes in the field […]”. Participation in the EU-SEC project has 
contributed to a greater understanding of the two European police issue networks which 
are most closely involved in major event security: the football policing network and the 
public order, terrorism and extremism network. 
          It has also highlighted the fact that police liaison work was essentially about the 
exchange of either professional development  related ‘best practice’ or more 
operationally related information or intelligence. Such liaison work did not, normally, 
encompass the new content of the more science and technology and equipment based 
ESRP. If these police issue networks are to cover such matters then it will raise questions 
about their competence in these new areas and how they will deal with the emerging 
industrial lobbies pressing for more spending on internal security research and 
procurement. Such commercial pressures have been described by Hayes (2006) as 
“arming big brother” and, from a US perspective, as “the security-industrial complex” 
(Prof. Peter Swire, Ohio State University in P. Harris, 2006). 
      This paper commences with an evaluation of the key features of the main EU policies 
on major event security and the implementation obligations expected of Member States. 
This is followed by a review of the football and public order policing networks. The 
conclusions from these two sections are then used to inform an examination of ESRP 
from the perspective of its potential impact upon these police issue networks. There then 
follows a consideration of possible transferable learning experiences from the EU 
defence equipment procurement cooperation initiatives and a highlighting of the new and 
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growing EU internal security interest groupings which are a mixture of European 
associations and lobbying consultancy bodies. 
 
 
2. EU major event security policies 
    The EU has a long history of regarding aspects of police cooperation and public order 
maintenance as a matter of common concern going back to the post-1975 TREVI system 
on co-operation which included a focus on football hooliganism intelligence and policing, 
(see Anderson et al, 1995, Crawford (ed.), 2002 and Occhipinti, 2003). Domestic or 
national policing responsibilities remain unchanged except in respect of obligations to co-
operate, share “information” and expertise. However, the delivery of such responsibilities 
can be shaped by EU level policies, (Walker (ed.), 2004). In particular, in this context 
attention has been drawn to “[…] the Europeanization of security […]”, (Bigo, 2000, 
p.68 and see also Monar, Rees and Mitsilegas, 2003). 
         Since the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the aim of making the EU an “area of 
freedom, security and justice”, there is the implication that wherever an individual is, in 
the EU, they should enjoy a common standard of security at a “major event”. This aim 
was specifically referred to by the EU Council, in May 2004, in the context of the Athens 
Olympics: “The EU’s objective is to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an 
area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member 
States in the field of police co-operation.” (EU Council, 2004) 
      Examples of policy development can be found in EU sources such as the Joint Action 
on co-operation on public order and security, ( 97/339/JHA May 1997) and the JHA 
Council Conclusions  on security at meetings of the European Council and other public 
events, (10916/01JAI82 July 2001). Such policies are discussed in JHA Council expert 
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groups and within the Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF) and these discussions have links 
to the Council General Secretariat Security Office which advises the Council of Ministers 
on security. The Security Office of the European Commission can also be involved 
‘where necessary.’ (ENFOPOL 123, 2002) Working through a number of relevant EU 
documents helps to establish key principles and issues. 
      In the ‘Security Handbook for the use of police authorities and services at 
international events such as meetings of the European Council’, (ENFOPOL 123, 2002). 
Two public order principles are set out:  (1) “The enforcement of law and order should be 
guided by the principles of proportionality and moderation preferring the less intrusive 
approach. Where possible, a deescalating police approach should be chosen.” (2) 
“Dialogue and cooperation with demonstrators and activists should be actively pursued 
by the police authorities.” The minimum implementing requirement is for each Member 
State to have a “national contact point” which is supposed to: collect, exchange and 
disseminate information and risk analyses. 
               The “Handbook for Member States Co-operation against terrorist acts at the 
Olympic Games and other comparable sporting events” demonstrates the dynamic nature 
of this EU policy area because the Handbook is seen as “an evolving instrument” which 
needs to be updated via future experiences and best practice. It specifically expects there 
to be inputs on: assessments of terrorist threats, suspect persons and threat levels, 
(ENFOPOL 14, 2004). A similar expectation is found in the EU Presidency note , 
“Proposals relating to the enhancement of measures to counter football related violence” 
(ENFOPOL 23, 2004) which contains suggestions as to improvements that could be 
made to the Football Handbook such as: improving the operational use of categories of 
estimated risk, better information on Member States travel restrictions rules, using the 
annual ad hoc report on football vandalism compiled by Belgium, the UK, The 
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Netherlands and Germany, mutual assessments of police effectiveness at major football 
events and developing a website because: “A single resource and reference centre for 
police working in this area could be very helpful.” The EU now seems to be moving 
towards simplifying major event security policy advice through the December 2006 EU 
Presidency Proposal for a single “Security handbook for the use of police authorities and 
services at international events” (ENFOPOL 190, 2006) for all events except football 
events which will remain covered by the 2006 EU football policing handbook. 
        In the early stages of the EU-SEC Project the Project partners became aware that 
there were definitional, content and outcomes issues to address. The ERA and ESRP 
documentation primarily seems to relate to scientific and technical research. The EU 
major event security documents do not refer to research rather they refer to ‘information’, 
‘risk assessments’, ‘threat assessments’ and ‘best practice’.  In strict ERA or ESRP terms 
these police issue networks might be expected to share research knowledge on, e.g., riot 
control equipment, CBRN detection equipment 4 , Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
systems, barrier technology and IT systems. This was certainly an assumption made by 
the initiators of the EU-SEC project with the implication that EU police issue networks 
would simply be able to add in this extra dimension to information sharing. However, it 
will be seen from the following issue network case studies that this was not the case. 
Moreover it will be suggested that the inherent differences between the two networks and 
the special characteristics of the ESRP are very relevant to any consideration of the 
feasibility of police cooperation task expansion to meet the demands of new EU policies. 
 It is necessary to recognize that, by comparison with the wider spread equipment 
procurement experience among the EU states’ military forces, the police services of the 
EU states have had a very limited contact with equipment procurement related science 
                                                 
4 “CBRN detection equipment” is a commonly used term for equipment to detect chemical, biological, 
radiological ., or nuclear materials. 
 9
and technology research. Until about the 1980s police internal security equipment, 
broadly defined, was relatively “low-tech” and was evolving at a much slower pace than 
military science and technology. The application of IT technology to policing and the 
increasing sophistication of the response required in the areas of; forensics, e-crime, 
physical border controls and post 9/11 counter-terrorism (especially countering CBRN 
threats) means that now police services need much greater procurement expertise in order 
to both accurately define their operational requirements and to evaluate competing 
commercial solutions in terms of value for money. There is the additional complication 
for police services that their use of new technologies must be compatible with the legal 
framework in which they operate in terms of human rights legislation, data protection 
laws and rules of evidence. 
 
3. The football policing network5
      This long-established, high-profile network derives its cohesion and commitment to 
sharing information and research from the following factors:- the popularity, national 
prestige and private sector investments (sponsorships etc) attached to football events; the 
need to ensure that a country is seen as having appropriate stadium standards and good 
behaviour by its football fans in order not to incur FIFA or UEFA bans; the common EU 
aim to prevent football hooliganism; the clear lead from the EU Council by its December 
2001 Decision that all Member States must designate a single national point of contact 
(NFIPs) for football policing issues related to European or international games and that 
its expertise has a “transferability” value for other major public events through the 
dissemination of best practice. For example, the Italian police football intelligence officer 
was also involved in the security arrangements for the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin. 
                                                 
5 This section draws on a fieldwork interview with the UK Football Policing Unit, 12/10/06 
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     This sector does not report any significant problems in sharing information or research 
other than the variable capabilities of the resources available for national contact points 
(Interview12/10/06). For example, the UK “national point of contact”, the UK Football 
Policing Unit, is supported by 92 police football intelligence officers (“spotters”) located 
in the constituent forces of UK police system. There is one such officer for each major 
league football club. Some other EU states do not have such a large support network for 
their national point of contact. However, not surprisingly, there are particular and 
variable national constraints in the sharing of personal data under both data protection 
and human rights legislation. Additionally, information or research that might be derived 
in whole or in part from national intelligence sources, such as a UK JTAC Assessment 
(Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre) would only be shared in a suitably indirect manner and 
on a strictly ‘need to know’ basis. 
        This network has and continues, to commission academic research into areas 
such as football hooliganism, crowd behaviour control strategies and risk management. 
Moreover, countries hosting very high-profile football events make significant efforts to 
promote information-sharing. For example, in preparing for the 2006 World Cup, the 
German Federal Ministry of the Interior organised international conferences in Berlin in 
2002 and 2003 (two conferences) to share experiences on major sporting and football 
events. Additionally, German fire department officials provided a detailed discussion of 
Word Cup related CBRN measures, in conformity, with the Nationales 
Sicherheitskonzept to the professional journal ‘NBC International’ (Winfield, 2006 (a), 
pp.72-75). 
      The network is also developing the peer review process, as proposed in ENFOPOL 23 
in 2004, and, in due course, the result of the peer reviews will also be disseminated. The 
website, mentioned in the Council’s ENFOPOL 23 document, has been constructed and 
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is available as the European National Football Information Point website, under password 
control for NFIPs and Europol, on the UK Centrex (police central training facility) 
website (ENFOPOL 158, 2006). This website contains not only police originated 
information for sharing but academic research papers as well. 
This network benefits from the fact that the high political visibility of international 
football events linked to their relative frequency of occurrence has ensured that football 
policing cooperation issues are a standing agenda item for each EU Presidency based on a 
Report from the Police Cooperation Working Party (experts on major sporting events). 
The network also makes full use of the impetus that can be provided by an active “core 
group” of Member States that routinely facilitates activities through the close cooperation 
of the Presidency and adjacent near past and near future Presidency states. 
        However, the network has not, so far, considered event security “equipment” 
because provision of such items, on essentially private spaces, is more a matter for the 
clubs, series organizers, FIFA/UEFA requirements and the requirements of national 
Health and Safety legislation. Nonetheless because of its well developed close working 
relationships this network will consider the implications of the September 2006 
Commission Green Paper, on detection technologies, because of its reference to the 
protection of mass events and possible EU security harmonization legislation. 
4. Information/ Research Sharing networks relating to public 
order, terrorism and extremism6
          Unlike the more bounded working environment of the EU football hooliganism 
intelligence network the non-football European major events public order intelligence 
network operates within a more diverse working environment. This can be summarized in 
                                                 
6 This section draws on fieldwork interviews with the UK National Public Order Intelligence Unit 
(31/10/06), the UK Police International Counter- Terrorism Unit (15/12/06) and a UK Counter-Terrorism 
& Extremism Liaison Officer (10/11/06). 
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the following points: the location and frequency of events such as EU Council meetings, 
state and VIP visits, G8 Summits and Olympic Games are more varied than with major 
football events; the likely public order problems are essentially political in character and, 
apart from terrorist threats, grounded in the democratic right of public protest as opposed 
to the mindless violence of football hooligans; EU Member States have a variable 
experience with the diverse “protest groups” according, in part, to national 
circumstances; the “protest groups” cover a broad spectrum of single-issue and multi-
issue concerns, for example, EU farmers’ groups protesting against an aspect of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, animal rights groups, environmental 
protection action groups, anti-capitalist groups and right or left wing political extremist 
groups. The only common theme, from a public order policing perspective, is that of 
‘extremism’ which implies a willingness to use violence against persons or property. 
Consequently, outside the football area, the police information/research sharing networks 
are more diverse in character. 
    Unlike the football intelligence network which has clear EU institutional linkages 
the public order network is based upon the wider membership Police Working Group on 
Terrorism (PWGT) which is an inter-agency network with governmental recognition. 
PWGT utilizes both its own secure communications network and links into a network of 
national liaison officers known as CTELOs (Counter-Terrorism and Extremism Liaison 
Officers). For example, the UK CTELO in France is attached to UCLAT in Paris and the 
French CTELO to the UK is located within the new Metropolitan Police Counter 
Terrorist Command (SO15). 
        Under the TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam action against, terrorism is 
defined as one of the priority areas through which a high level of security is to be 
achieved for EU citizen(Article 29) in view of making the EU an “area of freedom, 
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security and justice” (Article 2).  However, when the CTELO network is tracked back to 
‘national contact points’ in the EU Member States, it is evident that the terrorism aspects 
are handled in a separate manner from other public order issues, (Gregory, 2003). For 
example, in the UK the National Coordinator for Domestic Extremism (NDCE) oversees 
the work of the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) but the NPOIU only 
feeds into the CTELO network on non-football and other major event security issues on 
issues related to extremists and extremist groups. Police information and intelligence 
related to terrorism flows from the UK to the European partners through the non-EU 
PWGT via the International Section of the Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism 
Command (SO15) and the Police International Counter-Terrorism Unit (PICTU). Even 
where the information flows on terrorism are exclusively to EU Member States such 
flows still go overwhelmingly by PWGT. 
  Well before 9/11 and even before the activation of Europol’s counter-terrorism 
mandate in 1999 there were occasional attempts at the Europeanization of counter-
terrorism information flows. For example in 1996 a JHA Joint Action had required the 
creation and maintenance of a ‘Directory of Specialised Counter-terrorist Competencies, 
Skills and Expertise in the Member States’. However, that Joint Action has not really 
been fully and continuously implemented owing to the variability of responses from 
Member States. 
           Within this diverse and partly non-EU based issue network, the information flows 
do not usually contain the kind of data that is envisaged to be encompassed by the ESRP. 
Such exchanges do occasionally take place but either in an ad hoc manner or via inter-
state structures such as the trilateral research links between the UK, The Netherlands and 
Germany on information exchange on surveillance technology and blast mitigation with 
the possibility of sharing of research tasks (UK PSTS, 2004) or via protective security 
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networks of security and intelligence agency officials such as those found in the UK’s 
National Security Advisory Centre (NSAC) (Gregory, 2005). In fact the only long-
established, publicly visible and, indeed, non-EU European issue network in the broad 
area of police-work sciences is the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes 
(ENFSI). 
5. The European Security Research Programme (ESRP): 
Commission as an ‘autonomous actor’ 
       This 2003 initiative used Commission powers, under Article157 (2) EC, to prompt 
Member States to address the need for coordinated action on EU industrial 
competitiveness issues in the security area. Under these powers the Commission may 
“take any useful initiative to promote such coordination.” (HC 42-xii, 2004, Paras 4-5) 
There are three important aspects to this Commission initiative. Firstly, the Commission 
used, initially, a politically low-visibility policy development route by setting up a 
“Group of Personalities” (GoP) in October 2003 to draft proposals, (See Hayes, 2006, 
p.13f).  Secondly, the GoP contained a significant industrial representation from EADS, 
BAE Systems, Thales, Finmeccanica, Indra, Siemens and Diehl. Moreover, although the 
Commissioners for DG Research and DG Information Society were members of the GoP, 
JHA Commissioner Vitorino was not a member of the GoP. Thirdly, as the UK House of 
Commons noted, the Commission was using powers under Treaty Title VI (Industry) 
which are distinct from Title XVIII (Research and Technological Development) powers 
which are the foundations for the EU’s Framework Programme for research and 
technological development.  
         Consequently, at least in the UK, when the Commission published its 
“Communication on the implementation of the Preparatory Action on the enhancement of 
the European industrial potential in the field of security research, towards a programme to 
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advance European Security through Research and Technology” (COM(04) 72, 2004) 
some concerns were raised. The UK House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee 
noted that the Communication contained no definition of “security research”, queried the 
Treaty powers used and noted that there appeared to be no connection in the Preparatory 
Action proposed with the agreed JHA priorities. Furthermore, the Committee agreed with 
the FCO Minister’s view that the Commission should “[…] limit its work to civilian 
security research [as] defence- related security issues are within the competence of 
Member States” (HC52-xii, 2004,Para 5.19.) In a later Report the Commons’ European 
Scrutiny Committee referred to its concerns about whether the ESRP complied with the 
requirements of subsidiarity and proportionality. However, a Minister stated that the 
Government felt that the Commission was aware of these issues and that “[…] it would 
be possible to negotiate a satisfactory agreement on the security theme” (HC 34-v, 2005, 
Para 18.12.)  The UK position was supported by France and Germany, and a Home 
Office chaired cross-Whitehall working group took some proposals to the Commission 
which formed part of the process of resolving the issues of concern, (HL182, 2006, App. 
D.) 
            The resolution of Member State concerns covered the following matters. Firstly, 
Commissioner Verheugen, in March 2006, stated that the ESRP “[…]has a very clear and 
exclusive focus on civil research […]”, (Ibid.) Secondly, on research projects involving 
dual-use technology the Commission has “[…] introduced bilateral institutional links, 
notably with the European Defence Agency (EDA), to ensure that the current and future 
research projects are transparent, complementary and non-duplicative” (HL182, 2006, 
Para 66.) Thirdly, Member States are seeking to ensure that the EU governance method 
for the space and security elements of FP7 allow for greater Member State control than 
the Qualified Majority Voting procedures applicable to the rest of FP7, (HL182, 2006, 
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Para 66-68.)  The Member States finally reached political agreement on FP7 in July 2006, 
(EU Council, Presse 215, July 2006). 
           There are two main challenges, arising  from the ESRP initiative, facing the 
EU public sector internal security agencies, such as the police major event security issue 
networks, discussed earlier. Firstly, there is the need to identify the preliminary national 
stages that are necessary so that these networks can be enabled to access and share the 
relevant science and technology based data. From the research carried out for the EU-
SEC project it seems probable that these established police issue networks are unlikely 
themselves to be the actual channel of communication for ESRP related data but they 
may be the route of access to other sources or more specialized national bodies, where 
those similar to the UK’s Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSOB) 
actually exist as discrete entities (HOSDB, 2005). Secondly and drawing on the long and 
often bitter experiences in the European defence procurement cooperation area (Hood, 
2004) is the challenge for public sector internal security agencies, like the police, to 
become, in UK MoD procurement strategy terms, SMART customers who can “[…] make 
the right decisions in acquiring […]complex and advanced systems” (Jordan, 2003, 
p.133.) In amplification, this approach means, as described in UK defence procurement, 
developing acquisitions expertise that provides “[…] a better approach to managing our 
key suppliers, and whether they truly have the resources and competences to undertake 
projects in the timescale and at the cost they are claiming” (Walmsley, 2003, p.27).        
6. The developing ESRP 
       The first stage in the development of ESRP came in February 2004 with the 
Commission Communication on “Preparatory Action on the enhancement of the 
European industrial potential in the field of Security research (PASR)”, (COM (2004)72, 
2004). At the launch in March  2004 Jacques Bus, Head of Unit at DG Information 
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Society for Security Research, said “The focus today is on building a community that will 
take us into the full-scale Security Research programme of the future” (European 
Commission, May 2004). The Commission proposed allocating 65m euros over the 
period 2004-06 to this aim with the future goal of developing a full Security research 
programme under FP7. Under these proposals certain activities have particular relevance 
for this article as they envisage the creation of yet more issue networks. For example, a 
summary presentation on PASR was produced in January 2006 and it included among 
“Supporting Activity Priorities” a facilitation proposal, (von Bose, 2006). The proposed 
mechanism is a “Coordination network between security technology stakeholders 
including research activities supported on national and/or regional level.” This can be 
linked to the potential contribution of the European Security: High Level Study on 
threats, Responses and Relevant Technologies (ESSTRT), one of the 12 proposals (out of 
170+ bids) funded under PASR 2004. ESSTRT, is a general roadmap for security 
research which “[…] aims at benchmarking existing activities, analysing gaps and 
proposing solutions on the basis of detailed research, including proposals for EU co-
operation” (MEM0/05/38, 2005). The ESSTRT Final Report of March 2006 contains the 
following proposed actions necessary to support the project’s “Principal Policy 
Recommendations” namely that Member States should ‘Devote more resources to 
intelligence capabilities and to sharing intelligence with key partners.’ (Supporting policy 
action 1), p.6), (ESSTRT, 2006, pp.6-9). 
      The second stage in the development of ESRP was the March 2004 Report of the GoP 
entitled “Research for a Secure Europe” which recommended the launching of an EU 
funded ESRP, (European Commission, March 2004). The GoP Report referred to the 
need for funding to boost EU internal security capability, closing the gap between civil 
and defence research and a need to focus on interoperability and connectivity as “key 
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elements”. It also recommended the establishment of the European ‘Security Research 
Advisory Board’ (ESRAB) to draw up strategic guidelines to prepare the research agenda 
of an ESRP and to advise on the principles and mechanisms of ESRP implementation. 
ESRAB was established in February 2005 with a membership drawn from more 
appropriate public and private sectors than the GoP. For example, the UK was 
represented by officials from the Home Office and Department of Trade and Industry as 
well representatives from BAE Systems and THALES; Germany had representation from 
the Bundeskriminalamt and Fraunhofer- Gesellschaft and Italy was represented by the 
Centro Studi e Riccerca Intelligence e Security and Finmeccanica, (HL182,2005, Annex 
B.)   The importance of ESRAB is that it provides an embryonic form of institutional 
structure in the internal security research field that could, potentially, begin to serve 
similar collective aims as the EDA in the defence field.  
          ESRAB produced a definitive report in September 2006 entitled “Meeting the 
Challenge”, (European Commission, PASR Call, 2006). The Report contains an 
important general caveat for the Europeanization of security process, namely, that 
“Research is not an end in itself. […] for technology to be effective it must be supported 
and synchronised with the requisite standards, legislation and societal acceptance” 
(European Commission, PASR Call, 2006, p.32).  In terms of the development of an EU 
internal security research institutional structure ESRAB made some significant 
suggestions which, again, involve the issue network creation. ESRAB recommended the 
establishment, from 2007, of a broadly mandated European Security Board (ESB) with a 
network of national “points of contact” with both supported by a steering group to ensure 
coherence and an “executive secretariat” funded by the EU, (ESRAB Report, p.62). 
Discussions on the establishment of an ESB were still continuing, as of December 2006. 
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         It was established from EU-SEC research that it is actually difficult to identify 
comprehensive national major event security research programmes because of the diverse 
character and variable frequency of these events and this means that there are very 
variable national and trans-national internal security research sharing networks.7 The UK 
was rather unusual in having the wide-ranging “Police Science and Technology Strategy 
2004-2005” [PSTS 04-09] which is described as “[…] a key vehicle for the delivery of 
the Government’s priorities presented in the National Policing Plan [NPP] […]”. Another 
significant feature of the UK situation is the existence of the Home Office Scientific 
Development Branch (HOSDB) which described itself as “[…] probably unique; we 
know of no other organisation in the world that conducts such a wide range of work in 
‘policing’ technology […]” and HOSDB (2005, p.1) says it works “[…] closely with 
selected law enforcement organisations across the world to share the risks, costs and 
benefits of complex technologies.” HOSDB employs over 200 scientists and engineers 
and is currently running 23 technical programmes and over 150 projects. Thus whereas 
the UK participants in the two police issue networks, discussed in this analysis, could be 
enabled to assist in ESRP policy related research information flows through reference to 
PSTS and HOSDB, the EU-SEC research suggested that this type of enablement might be 
more problematic for other Member States. 
 
7. The wider implications of Internal Security 
research/procurement and the links to defence equipment cooperation  
     Although the history of collaborative defence procurement is littered with failed 
projects and accounts of the complexities of the specification agreement, financial 
arrangements and project management structures it has recorded some successes and the 
                                                 
7 Fieldwork interview with HOSDB official 28/11/06 
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EU states are now seriously attempting to address the core problems (Hood, 2004). 
However, the comments made by Hayward in the late 1980s that: “European 
technological collaboration is unquestionably a highly political activity. This is inevitable 
in a field where key technologies are so closely linked to military and economic security 
and where at the same time important national interests of states must be accommodated 
[…]”, (Hayward, 1987, p.11) are still valid today. In October 2006 the Airbus’ industrial 
group, EADS, was warned by Lord Drayson, the UK Minister for Defence Procurement, 
that “As a key customer, we see it as important for EADS to move in a direction that is 
free from political interference” (The Times 5/10/06). 
        The commonly found problems within multinational defence procurement were: 
difficulties in agreeing the Operational Requirement (OR) despite facing a common 
threat; pressures from national defence industries to secure particular national 
commercial advantages; cost control problems resulting from attempts to meet sometimes 
competing preferences within the particular OR; project vulnerability to subsequent 
national political decisions that might either reduce the number of partner-countries or the 
scale of the production-run and insistence by partner-countries on a fair return on 
investment (‘juste retour’) on each project. 
      The European Commission has been trying to persuade Member States to address 
these problems for some time. Its latest attempt was represented by the 2004 Green Paper 
on Defence Procurement, (COM (2004)608).  In that Green Paper the European 
Commission highlighted some general issues that have a transferability relevance to the 
European internal security area. The Commission raised concerns about: the reduced size 
of national markets for defence industry products leading to problems of off-setting high 
R&D costs because of reduced economies of scale options; fragmentation of R& D 
spending in Europe increases national costs and that these factors damage the 
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competitiveness of the European defence industry and its “[…] ability to meet the 
requirements of the ESDP’ (Ibid.). 
        In one respect European defence procurement has, at the present, an advantage over 
the embryonic attempts to promote European internal security equipment procurement 
collaboration through its longer established organisational structures. Since 1996 the 
Joint Organisation for Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR – given legal personality in 
2000), open to all EU states (but currently only comprising the “big five” defence 
industry states; Germany, Belgium, France, Italy & UK) has been trying to replace “[…] 
the system of juste retour per programme by an “overall juste retour” covering several 
years and several programme[…]”(Ibid.). 
          More recently, in 2004, the EU set up the European Defence Agency (EDA) (Joint 
Action 2004/551/CFSP, 2004 and see Trybus, 2006)) to help Member States meet their 
capabilities goals under the ESDP. Among the ways EDA seeks to achieve its goals there 
is one which might be seen as comparable to the needs of the internal security area that is 
“Helping them [Member States] to identify common needs and promoting collaboration 
through common solutions” (EDA). The EDA is, in EU institutional terms, an Agency of 
the EU operating under the Authority of the Council of Ministers with the EU’s 
Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, as its 
Head of Agency and Chair of the Steering Board of Defence Ministers.  If a comparable 
structure was considered appropriate for the internal security/JHA area, such as the 
proposed European Security Board (ESB), then the EDA could serve as a model. In that 
case the comparable agency head might be Gijs de Vries because of his role as EU 
Counter Terrorism coordinator with the Steering Board being composed of the JHA 
Ministers. 
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              British official comment on the establishment of the EDA draws attention to 
a number of cautionary points relating to Member State concerns that might well arise in 
the internal security area. The then UK Defence Secretary, Geoffrey Hoon, told the 
Commons “The EDA is designed in such a way that will not turn into a supranational 
body that dictates procurement decisions. […] it cannot force the UK to compromise kit 
for our armed forces or to accept a “fortress Europe” (i.e. anti-American) defence 
industrial policy” (UK House of Commons European Standing Committee B June 2004, 
see also Symons, 2000, p.17). However, Mr. Hoon did emphasise that he felt that the 
EDA would “[…] improve the essential link between the job of defining capability and 
the concrete delivery of those capabilities.” Additionally he stressed, in supporting the 
creation of a new agency, that ‘Only a permanent staff dedicated to improving European 
defence capabilities and spreading best practice can take all the components of capability 
improvements to the next level” (Commons European Standing Committee B June 2004). 
              It might be beneficial if a mutually reinforcing relationship can be developed 
between the emerging ESRP and the longer established EDA so that there can be 
enhanced opportunities for collaborative research and procurement at the interface 
between defence requirements and internal security research requirements. This is 
because there is already a potentially relevant new “Contract Notice- Request to 
Participate” from the EDA, dated September 26th 2006, that has possible internal security 
utility against CBRN terrorism. This EDA initiative reflects the identified need for “[…] 
the definition of an Integrated Biological Defence System Architecture […]” and it is 
hoped that the contracted study will be able to “[…] propose a generic biological defence 
system architecture with the view of using this as a reference for future EU capability 
developments” (EDA, File Ref. 06-CAP-047, 26/9/06). 
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        In general terms, an EU state seeking to procure a new item of security 
equipment (broadly defined to cover, for example, lethal and non-lethal weapons, IT, 
dogs, vehicles, CCTV technology, specialised vehicles, detection devices, 
communications equipment and barrier technology) has the following choices: off the 
shelf purchase from a national or external commercial source (COTS); procurement from 
an “in-house” facility such as a national ordnance factory; ‘in-house’ R&D followed by 
commercial supplier production; ‘in-house’ R&D followed by in-house production in 
situations where there is no private sector option or where small production runs and/or 
high technical risk make a commercial partnership unlikely and consideration of the 
desirability of a bilateral or multilateral project. 
     Unlike defence procurement internal security equipment procurement, in the pre 9/11, 
era was mostly relatively “low tech” and largely purchased to meet purely national needs. 
However, post 9/11, the internal security threat range has increased both in scale and 
consequence and hence greater technical sophistication is being required from counter-
measures. Moreover, within the EU there is an aspiration, based upon the concept of “an 
area of freedom, security and justice” for Member States to offer greater equivalence in 
security protection measures. This is particularly evident in the Commission 2006’ Green 
Paper on detection and associated technologies in the work of law enforcement, customs 
and other security authorities’ (COM (2006) 474). 
        There are two developments in EDA practice that may have a form of transferability 
into the ESRP area with regard to more cooperative research sharing and possibly 
common procurement. Firstly, EDA Member States have agreed a voluntary Code of 
Conduct on Defence Procurement under which a participating Member State will, under 
certain conditions, “[…] open up to suppliers in each others’ territories all defence 
procurement opportunities of € 1 million or more[…]”, (HL 125, p.9.) Secondly, EDA is 
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tasked with “[…] developing a single portal for announcement of all new contracting 
opportunities […]” (Ibid.). 
 
8.  Industrial pressures 
     One point that is strongly made in the more civil-liberties based approaches to this 
topic is the need to be aware of commercial pressures from the growing, post 9/11, 
homeland/internal security industry (Hayes, 2006). It has been estimated, by the US 
market research company Frost & Sullivan that by 2014 the European homeland security 
market (biometrics, screening, RFID, UAVs and CCTV) will have a value of nearly 
874m euros (prnewsire.co.uk, 2006). 
         However, there is a potential obstacle to free-flowing research sharing and 
procurement collaboration in the division of national industrial strategic approaches 
between countries, such as France, which are stressing national industrial protection and 
the UK, which favours much more open EU-transatlantic security industrial co-operation. 
The French position, as stated in 2005, was that 11 sectors of its economy were of 
strategic importance and should be protected from foreign take-overs. Among these 
sectors the French government listed:- research into anti-terror measures including 
defence against chemical attack, bugging and surveillance equipment, dual-use 
technology with civilian and military applications and companies providing IT security 
services to a public operator(The Times, 9/10/06). Needless to say the EU Commission is 
challenging the French protectionist position. 
          In order to provide some comparative data on commercial pressures, this section 
will commence with an overview of the situation in the US.  Paul Harris in ‘The 
Observer’ commented that “Five years after the World Trade Centre fell, a highly 
lucrative industry has been borne in America – homeland security. There has been a 
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goldrush as companies scoop up government contracts and peddle products they say are 
designed to make America safe” (The Observer, 10/9/06). The growth in companies 
offering homeland security products or lobbying for the sector in the US, based upon the 
Harris’ article, is set out below. 
 
Year Number of US companies offering 
Homeland Security products. 
Registered Homeland Security 
Lobbying Firms. 
1999 9  
2001  2 
2003 3,512  
2005  543 
2006 33,890  
 
Since 2000 the US Government has gives out homeland security contracts worth $130bn 
[£70bn] and by 2015 it is estimated that federal homeland security spending in industry 
could reach $170bn.         
      Whilst the EU area does not register this level of growth in homeland/internal  
security spend and its linked commercial pressures they do, nevertheless, exist and have 
been a formative factor in the creation of the ESRP (Hayes, 2006, pp.9-10). The 
‘umbrella’ Brussels lobbying organisation for this area is the Aerospace and Defence 
Industrial Association of Europe (ASD). Moreover, the first Report of the EU Advisory 
Group on Aerospace ‘Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century’ saw the ‘ultimate 
goal’ as the establishment of a ‘European armaments policy to provide structure for 
European defence and security equipment market […]”, (Ibid.). Among other European 
lobbying groups there is a non-profit organisation, the European Homeland Security 
Association (EHSA), formed in 2004, which focuses on civil defence and protection. 
Interestingly though, EHSA has among its partner institutions not only those that might 
be expected such as GCSP in Geneva, INHES in Paris and SIPRI in Stockholm but also 
CSIS in Washington DC and IDSS in Singapore. Moreover EHSA’s sponsors include 
Thales and EADS. 
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       Additionally, there are clear pressures from some security product ‘end-users’ for 
increased EU and Member States public funding of post 9/11 security requirements for 
the private sector. For example, the European air transport industry has noted that “[…] 
from 2001 to 2003 the US government paid over US $ 3 billion to compensate their 
national aviation industry for the cost of anti-terrorist measures. European governments, 
on the other hand, have so far refused to bear the costs for such measures, which aim at 
the protection of society in genera” (EATI, Policy Paper, 2003). 
       A potentially complicating factor, for EU collaboration in this field, is that of the 
variable relationships between the EU Member States and the US, which has already 
been referred to in relation to the UK’s determination not to allow a security industrial 
policy to emerge by which a “fortress Europe” approach might make industrial links with 
the US  problematic. The UK Government’s ‘Trade & Investment’ website advertised for 
corporate participation in a “UK Technologies for Security Mission to the USA” from 30 
October to 3 November 2005 in Boston and Washington DC. This UK initiative made 
specific reference to the relevance of various US DHS – Home Office cooperation 
arrangements and thus highlighted the fact that UK-US cooperation in homeland security 
was well established and furnished with appropriate supporting structures. By contrast, 
France’s more European orientation is well expressed by Dr. Pascal Stephan of the 
French DGA who  is quoted (Winfield, 2006 (b), p.16) as saying, with reference to the 
ESRAB IMPACT project (Innovative Measures for Protection Against CBRN 
Terrorism), that “What we [France] would like to get from Impact is the ability to 
promote contractors in Europe developing technology.” 
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9. Conclusions 
 
      This paper concludes that, notwithstanding the ESRP initiative, there is no clear 
need for more police information/research exchange issue networks. There is already a 
problem of network multiplication and overlap within the evolving ESRP frameworks. 
There may, however, be scope for some form of network rationalization or inter-
connection especially as there is no discrete ‘major event security’ network as such. The 
established networks in football and public order do not report any major obstacles to 
information sharing in their fields of competence other than those expected under ECHR, 
Data Protection laws and national security constraints. However, they have not, to date, 
contemplated the issue of security equipment, broadly defined, research sharing. 
    It would appear therefore that the ESRP may need to engage more closely with the 
issue of coordinating/sharing networks related to the Member State level of research 
programmes on internal security. Firstly, as already noted these may simply not exist as 
discrete entities but rather only exist as dispersed activities across a range of both public 
and private sector bodies. Secondly, the typical police official involved in the current 
information/research sharing networks is unlikely to be in close contact with the 
development and formulation of the more scientific and technical areas of event security. 
Thirdly, because the counter-terrorism response now tends to dominate general and event 
security concerns regarding new technologies it is very likely that the national fora within 
which such research is developed will operate in very restrictive security classification 
mode. Therefore any consequent trans-national research sharing which does occur is 
likely to be restricted to those countries with which a state has particularly privileged 
bilateral relations or within some privileged multi-lateral framework like the EU G6 
group. 
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    The most recent example of this was in the Conclusions of the October EU G6 
Meeting which “agreed to take the following specific actions to combat the [terrorist] 
threat: share ongoing research into explosives, in particular on liquid explosives and 
giving support for more EU funding and support work on traceability of explosives and 
an early warning system on diverted explosives” (G6 Conclusions, October 2006). These 
G6 countries’ action points have subsequently been offered some project funding support 
by DG Justice, Freedom and Security. 
         However, this does not mean that national police information/research sharing 
contact points would be unable to share anything of significance regarding security 
equipment, broadly defined through EU police cooperation networks. They could be 
enabled to construct responses in the following areas: identifying, for a detailed response, 
those parts of police agencies which are more closely involved; drawing attention to 
national public or private sector open sources on new equipment purchases or equipment 
“bench-marking”; drawing attention to relevant open source publications in national 
scientific and technical journals or similar sources. A common feature, though, of all of 
the above is that they would require some form of EU or national resource input to the 
police contact point so that the contact point could be briefed or know where to go for 
further advice. 
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